Whitepaper: How to save the futures industry

Preventative Measures

While this may put out the fires in the short-term, at the end of the day, there's still much more work to be done. It's not enough to simply react; we need to be proactive about preventing this from ever occurring again. How? We're glad you asked.

1. Extend SIPC protection to futures investors. When it came to light that the SIPC was rapidly moving to ensure that all claims to the assets of MF Global were resolved, the initial reaction of many industry participants was to breathe a sigh of relief. However, as many soon found out, SIPC protection is currently only offered to securities customers- meaning only those trading stocks and bonds would be covered, and not our beloved exchange traded futures investors. In our minds, there is zero reason why investors in traditional asset classes should be afforded such protection while investors in the alternative space are not.

As such, we propose that regulations governing the SIPC be amended to ensure protection of futures clients’ holdings as well, with guarantees on the individual account level (the sub-account of the customer segregated account on the FCM’s books) and not just the main overall account level containing all of the customer funds.

The CME and ICE should cut 10% off their marketing budget and put that to lobbying Congress for this protection. This isn’t 1970, when stocks and bonds were the only game in town. If the world turns to the CME to manage risk, the CME needs to turn to Congress to lower the risk of managing that risk.

2. Amend CFTC rule 1-25 to limit segregated funds investment to US Treasuries only. One of the issues that's gotten a lot of press since the shortfall in funds at MF Global went public is the idea that Corzine might have used those funds to finance his European bets. There's no proof of this yet, but the concept alone rattled many. The general belief was that FCMs could not, under any circumstances, touch segregated funds.

That's not true. Under 1-25, FCMs are allowed to gain interest on excess segregated funds through specific investments under explicitly outlined circumstances. There are three limitations that really matter here: preservation of capital, preservation of liquidity, and adherence to risk standards.

Under the rule, FCMs can invest in 6 different vehicles (U.S. treasuries, state bonds, government agencies, commercial paper, corporate notes or bonds, sovereign debt, and money market mutual funds), but, with the exception of U.S. Treasuries or money markets, these vehicles have to have the highest rating possible from one of the NRSROs- or, official ratings agencies. This means that, technically speaking, the allegations flying around that FCMs may legally use segregated funds to invest in high-risk junk bonds are utterly incorrect. That being said, we're still not satisfied with the requirements.

If we learned anything from 2008, it is that ratings agencies were doling out the highest ratings possible on toxic mortgage-backed securities right up to the point that things blew up. In fact, the rating agencies even downgraded MF Global…wait for it…. after they went bankrupt. Our trust in their ability to assess risk adequately enough to ensure the preservation of segregated client funds is nil. As such, our recommendation is that 1-25 be amended to prohibit investment of segregated account funds in anything but U.S. Treasuries. While a statement issued today by CFTC Commissioner Scott O'Malia pointed out that we do not know the root cause of the missing funds, and that it's possible the missing funds have nothing to do with investments permitted under 1-25, in our minds, this changes nothing; this rule needs to be altered regardless of the MF Global investigation's conclusions.

Comments
comments powered by Disqus